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Contiki-NG's LwM2M TLV parser lwm2m_tlv_read() in os/services/lwm2m/lwm2m-tlv.c ignores its caller-supplied buffer length argument and reads up to six bytes from the input buffer with no bounds check. The caller in lwm2m-engine.c iterates while there is at least one byte remaining, so a crafted CoAP WRITE to any LwM2M endpoint whose final TLV supplies exactly one byte triggers up to five out-of-bounds reads of heap memory adjacent to the CoAP input buffer, disclosing memory contents (including key material and peer addresses) through the parsed tlv->id, tlv->length, and tlv->value fields. Corrupted tlv_len derived from the out-of-bounds memory further corrupts the caller's parse offset. In LwM2M NoSec mode, the default for constrained devices, no authentication is required.
Published
August 6, 2026
Last Modified
August 6, 2026